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1961] NOTES
interests of the riparian owners and the diversity of circum-
stances that attach to problems of this nature, it is felt that the
court's liberal interpretation of Article 516 of the Civil Code
will bring about more just and equitable results in allocation of
alluvion between riparian proprietors in the future.
D. Mark Bienvenu
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - CENSORSHIP OF MOTION PICTURE FILMS
A Chicago ordinance required submission of motion picture
films to the Commissioner of Police in order to obtain a permit
for public exhibition." Petitioner was denied a permit for public
exhibition of the film "Don Juan" on refusal to submit the film
to the Commissioner. Petitioner challenged the ordinance on the
grounds that requiring submission of all films prior to public
exhibition rendered the ordinance an unconstitutional prior re-
straint,2 contending that all prior restraints on motion picture
riparian property is on a major navigable body of water the property owners'
interest in maintaining access to such a watercourse can be significantly valuable.
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Figure 1 F1sure 2
In Figure I riparian proprietors A and B own equal portions of original
shore line. It can readily be seen that by using the area method of division, as
represented by line xy, B's access to the river is substantially decreased, while
A's shoreline is substantially increased. In Figure 2 riparian proprietor A has
three times as much shoreline as B. Using the frontage method of division, as
represented by line xz, will result in an inequitable distribution of the alluvial
area.
1. MUNICIPAL CODE OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO § 155-4 authorizes the Commis-
sioner of Police to refuse to issue a permit when a film is "immoral or obscene,
or portrays depravity, criminality, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens of any
race, color, creed, or religion and exposes them to contempt, derision, or obloquy,
or tends to produce a breach of the peace or riots, or purports to represent any
banging, lynching, or burning of a human being."
2. A prior restraint is generally defined as interfering "by censorship or in-
junction before the words are spoken or printed." 2 SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTI-
TUTioNAL LAw 1030 (1938).
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films are unconstitutional within the prohibition of the first and
fourteenth amendments of the Constitution. The federal district
court dismissed the case8 on the ground that there was no justi-
ciable controversy and its decision was upheld by the court of
appeals. 4 On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court,
held, affirmed, four Justices dissenting. The fact that an ordi-
nance provides for inspection of motion picture films by city
officials prior to public exhibition does not render it unconstitu-
tional on its face as a violation of freedom of speech and press,
since those guarantees do not prohibit all prior restraints. Times
Film Corp. v. Chicago, 81 Sup. Ct. 391, rehearing denied, 29 L.W.
3277 (U.S. 1961).
The first and fourteenth amendments of the Constitution
prohibit the fedral government and the states from abridging
freedom of speech and press.5 Prior to Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v.
Wilson,0 decided in 1952, motion pictures were considered to be
businesses operated for profit and were not afforded constitu-
tional protection under the first and fourteenth amendments. 7
In the Burstyn case, however, the Supreme Court overruled its
prior holding concerning motion pictures8 and held that motion
picture films are within the constitutional protection of freedom
of speech and press." In several cases following the Burstyn
case, the Court held invalid particular local ordinances allowing
discretion to public officials in imposing prior restraints on mo-
tion pictures.10
3. Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 180 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Ill. 1959).
4. 272 F.2d 90 (7th Cir. 1959).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. 1 -provides that "Congress shall make no law
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." In Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652 (1925), the Supreme Court held that freedom of speech and of the press
protected from abridgment by the federal government under the first amendment
is also protected from abridgment by the states under the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment.
6. 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
7. See Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 236 U.S. 230 (1915).
8. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952) : "To the extent
that language in the opinion in Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 8upra,
is out of harmony with the views here set forth, we no longer adhere to it."
9. In the Burstyn case, the Court declared as an unconstitutional prior re-
straint a statute allowing a public official to refuse to issue a license for public
exhibition of a motion picture which, in the opinion of the official, was sacri-
legious.
10. Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the University of the
State of New York, 360 U.S. 684 (1959) (refusal of license to exhibit publicly
the film "Lady Chatterley's Lover" on the grounds that the motion picture is
immoral) ; Superior Films, Inc. v. Department of Education, 346 U.S. 587 (1954):
(refusal of license to exhibit publicly motion picture on the grounds that the pic-
ture would corrupt morals) ; Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S. 960 (1952) (refusal to
issue license to exhibit publicly motion picture on grounds that it was prejudicial
to the best interests of the people of the city).
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The constitutional protection of freedom of speech and of the
press does not provide an absolute guarantee for any utterance
or communication. In several cases, the Court has held the regu-
lation of forms of communication under certain circumstances to
be constitutionally permissible," but the particular communica-
tion was restrained after being uttered or published. However,
statutes and ordinances imposing prior restraints have generally
been held unconstitutional when the particular law has allowed
a public official to determine in his own opinion what should be
spoken or distributed, or that the particular standards provided
in such laws were not well defined.' 2 Although the Court has
displayed this reluctance to uphold any statute or ordinance im-
posing a prior restraint on forms of communication, it has, on
previous occasions, indicated that a prior restraint on forms of
communication is permissible in exceptional cases. Thus in
Near v. Minnesota,3 the Court, speaking through Mr. Chief
Justice Hughes, stated that "protection even as to previous re-
straint is not absolutely unlimited. But the limitation has been
recognized only in exceptional cases .... [T] he primary require-
ments of decency may be enforced against obscene publications.
The security of the community life may be protected against in-
11. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (conviction for displaying
lithographs in violation of statute making it unlawful to display a publication
which "portrays depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class
of citizens, of any race, color, creed or religion . . . or . . . exposes the citizens
of any race, color, creed or religion to contempt, derision, or obloquy or which
produces breach of the peace or riots") ; Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949)
(city ordinance making it unlawful to operate a loud speaker on the public streets
emitting loud and raucous noises) ; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568(1942) (statute prohibiting any person from addressing any offensive, derisive,
or annoying word to any other person in public places; Jehovah's Witness con-
victed of addressing certain remarks toward city marshal).
12. See Staub v. Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958) (city ordinance prohibiting labor
unions from soliciting members without first receiving a permit from the mayor
and city council) ; Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951) (city ordinance pro-
hibiting the holding of public worship meetings on the street without first obtain-
ing a permit from the city commissioner) ; Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268
(1951) (Jehovah's Witness denied permit to hold Bible talk in public park by park
commissioner and city council) ; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) (state
statute prohibiting soliciting members for labor unions without first obtaining
organizer's permit from secretary of state) ; Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418
(1943) (prohibition on soliciting orders or selling literature without first obtain-
ing permit from mayor) ; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (prohi-
bition on soliciting for any religious group without first obtaining a permit from
secretary of the public welfare council) ; Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939)
(city ordinance prohibiting public assembly in streets and parks without obtaining
permit from director of public safety) ; Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939)
(prohibition on distributing literature without receiving permit from police offi-
cial) ; Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (prohibition on distributing
literature without first obtaining written permission from city manager).
13. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
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citements to acts of violence and the overthrow of orderly gov-
ernment.
' 14
In cases prior to the instant case, the particular standards
and procedures prescribed by the statute or ordinance were chal-
lenged. Upon examining these standards or procedures, if the
Court found them to be not well defined or allowing a wide lati-
tude of discretion to public officials issuing permits, the law was
declared unconstitutional. In the instant case, however, the ma-
jority of the court was of the opinion that the particular stand-
ards or procedures prescribed by the ordinance were not chal-
lenged; rather, the basic authority to censor motion pictures was
at issue.15
It would seem that in the instant case the formulation of the
issue by the majority of the Court is subject to question. The
question was not whether all forms of motion picture censorship
are unconstitutional; rather, the question was specifically
whether local governments may require submission of all motion
picture films to public officials for licensing prior to public ex-
hibition. 6 The Court has consistently refused to uphold such
requirements in dealing with other forms of communication. If
motion pictures are to be accorded the same protection of free-
dom of speech and press as other forms of communication, it
would seem that requiring motion picture films to be submitted
to a public official for licensing prior to public exhibition would
be equally as unconstitutional as requiring submission of books,
magazines, or newspapers prior to distribution.
14. Id. at 715-16. This statement also quoted in part in Kingsley Books, Inc.
v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 441 (1957) and in Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343
U.S. 495, 503-04 (1952).
15. Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 81 Sup. Ct. 391, 393 (1961) : "The challenge
here is to the censor's basic authority; it does not go to any statutory standards
employed by the censor or procedural requirements as to the submission of the
film."
16. Brief for the Petitioner, Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 81 Sup. Ct. 391(1961), p. 4: "The real question presented by the case is whether those sections
of the Chicago censorship ordinance which require every motion picture to be
submitted for censorship of content prior to public exhibition can withstand a
constitutional challenge under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution." Mr. Chief Justice Warren's dissenting opinion (Times Film
Corp. v. Chicago, 81 Sup. Ct. 391, 398 (1961)) stated: "I hesitate to disagree
with the Court's formulation of the issue before us . . . the question presented
in this case is not whether a motion picture exhibitor has a constitutionally pro-
tected, 'complete and absolute freedom to exhibit, at least once, any and every
kind of motion picture.' . . . The question here presented is whether the City of
Chicago - or, for that matter, any city, any State or the Federal Government-
may require all motion picture exhibitors to submit all films to a police chief,
mayor or other administrative official, for licensing and censorship prior to public
exhibition within the jurisdiction."
[Vol. XXI
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By its decision in the instant case, the majority of the Court
may be placing motion pictures in a different category from
other constitutionally protected forms of communication." There
is a substantial body of opinion supporting this distinction. The
contention is that because motion pictures have a greater poten-
tial for creating an undesirable effect on public opinion, on the
peace and order of the community, and on the attitudes and char-
acter of children than other forms of communication, local gov-
ernments should be able to utilize licensing and censorship re-
quirements in order to prevent the showing of those motion pic-
tures which may produce these adverse effects. 18 A motion pic-
ture audience has the immediate capability of producing riots,
whereas a reader of a book or a television viewer does not.
Graphic portrayals in motion pictures have a greater capacity
for provoking immoral conduct than public speeches.
On the other hand, the dissenting opinions advance strong
arguments as to the unconstitutionality of laws imposing licens-
ing or censorship on any constitutionally protected form of com-
munication.'9 The dissenters appeared to feel that the proper
method of preventing the showing of motion pictures which
would tend to produce undesirable effects is not by allowing a
censor to restrain motion pictures, but by penalizing those who
actually exhibit undesirable motion pictures through a criminal
proceeding in a court of law.
It would seem that the position advanced by the dissenting
17. Id. at 395: "We recognized in Burstyn, supra, that 'capacity for evil . . .
may be relevant in determining the permissible scope of community control,' . . .
and that motion pictures were not 'necessarily subject to the precise rules govern-
ing any other particular method of expression. Each method,' we said, 'tends to
present its own peculiar problems.' "
18. Brief for Respondents, Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 81 Sup. Ct. 391(1961), p. 9: The City of Chicago advances a strong argument for this proposi-
tion in the instant case. "Movies, like television, cannot be placed in the same
category with newspapers, books, magazines, and the like. The appeal of the
motion picture to the young and innocent, to the susceptible, and to the potential
killer, rapist or armed robber, require some kind of governmental protection."
19. Mr. Chief Justice Warren, with whom Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice
Douglas, and Mr. Justice Brennan joined, dissented on the ground that the issue
in the case was not whether all prior restraints on motion picture films are un-
constitutional but whether the City of Chicago or any local government may
require all motion picture exhibitors to submit all films to a police chief, mayor,
or other administrative official for licensing and censorship prior to public ex-
hibition within the jurisdiction. Further, although the Court has stated on pre-
vious occasions that prior restraints on speech and press are permissible in excep-
tional cases, licensing or censorship does not come within these exceptional cases.
Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 81 Sup. Ct. 391, 395 (1961). Mr. Justice Douglas,
with whom the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Black concurred, dissented on the




opinions in the instant case is the more desirable one. In a free
society, it is necessary that there be a minimum of restraint on
means of communication, and that permissible restraints be
within limited areas. Although local governments should be able
to restrain those communications which are obscene or would
tend to incite unrest or riots, this power should be exercised in
such a manner as to impose only those restraints which are abso-
lutely necessary to accomplish the community purpose. In cen-
sorship and licensing regulations, there is a great opportunity
for the censor to apply his personal opinion as to what should be
allowed to be communicated. On the other hand, if local govern-
ments are obliged to restrain undesirable communications
through judicial remedies, then the community purpose is still
accomplished and at the same time the individual is deprived of
communicating freely only after an open hearing in a court of
law.20 If it is necessary to regulate forms of communication in
order to maintain proper standards in the community, it would
seem more desirable that standards be interpreted and restraints
be imposed by courts of law rather than by censors.
Frank F. Foil
CRIMINAL LAW- LIABILITY FOR PRIOR CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE
The defendant loaned his car to a person who was intoxicated
and who subsequently became involved in an automobile accident
in which the driver of another car was killed. At the time of
the accident the defendant was not in the car, but he was tried
and convicted for the crime of involuntary manslaughter. The
defendant contended that he could not be convicted because he
was not a principal to the killing. On appeal to the Supreme
Court of Michigan, held, reversed. The accountability of the
owner of the automobile must rest upon his complicity in the
misconduct involved. Where the criminal conduct was not
counseled by him, was not accomplished by another acting jointly
with him and did not occur in the attempted accomplishment
of some joint enterprise, the defendant cannot be held criminally
20. See Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957). The Supreme
Court upheld a law authorizing a public official to maintain action in court for an
injunction to prevent the sale or distribution of obscene matter possessed by any
person within the municipality with intent to sell or distribute the same on the
ground that the statute provided for a trial within one day after joinder of issue
with decision to be rendered within two days after the close of the trial.
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